Paper 2025/611 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/611 ↗
Proving CPU Executions in Small Space
Abstract
zkVMs are SNARKs for verifying CPU execution. They allow an untrusted prover to show that it correctly ran a specified program on a witness, where the program is given as bytecode conforming to an instruction set architecture like RISC-V. Existing zkVMs still struggle with high prover resource costs, notably large runtime and memory usage. We show how to implement Jolt—an advanced, sum-check- based zkVM—with a significantly reduced memory footprint, without relying on SNARK recursion, and with only modest runtime overhead (potentially well below a factor of two). We discuss benefits of this approach compared to prevailing recursive techniques.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2025-04-03: last updated
- 2025-04-03: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/611
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/611,
author = {Vineet Nair and Justin Thaler and Michael Zhu},
title = {Proving CPU Executions in Small Space},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/611},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/611}
}