Paper 2025/851 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/851 ↗

V$\epsilon$rity: Verifiable Local Differential Privacy

James Bell-Clark
Adrià Gascón
Baiyu Li
Mariana Raykova
Amrita Roy Chowdhury
Abstract

Local differential privacy (LDP) enables individuals to report sensitive data while preserving privacy. Unfortunately, LDP mechanisms are vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where adversaries controlling a fraction of the reporting users can significantly distort the aggregate output--much more so than in a non-private solution where the inputs are reported directly. In this paper, we present two novel solutions that prevent poisoning attacks under LDP while preserving its privacy guarantees. Our first solution, $\textit{V}\epsilon\textit{rity-}{\textit{Auth}}$, addresses scenarios where the users report inputs with a ground truth available to a third party. The second solution, $\textit{V}\epsilon\textit{rity}$, tackles the more challenging case in which the users locally generate their input and there is no ground truth which can be used to bootstrap verifiable randomness generation.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2025-05-14: last updated
2025-05-14: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/851
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/851,
      author = {James Bell-Clark and Adrià Gascón and Baiyu Li and Mariana Raykova and Amrita Roy Chowdhury},
      title = {V$\epsilon$rity: Verifiable Local Differential Privacy},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/851},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/851}
}
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