Paper 2025/878 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/878 ↗

Blockcipher-Based Key Derivation without PRP/PRF Switching

Fabrice Benhamouda
Shai Halevi
Panos Kampanakis
Hugo Krawczyk
Abstract

We examine the use of blockcipher-based key derivation beyond the birthday bound, arguing that the analysis step of PRP/PRF switching can be eliminated in many cases. To support this, we consider a modified ``ideal model'' for keying cryptographic applications in the multi-instance setting, where keys are chosen to be random \emph{but distinct}, rather than completely independent). Our analysis shows that typical cryptographic applications remain secure in this model. One consequence is that it is typically safe to derive close to $2^n$ keys using an $n$-bit blockcipher in counter mode. In particular, considering the practice of nonce-derived keys for authenticated encryption, our results imply that modes such as XAES-256-GCM that use CMAC-based key derivation are safe to use with more than $2^{64}$ distinct nonces.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2025-05-17: last updated
2025-05-17: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/878
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/878,
      author = {Fabrice Benhamouda and Shai Halevi and Panos Kampanakis and Hugo Krawczyk},
      title = {Blockcipher-Based Key Derivation without PRP/PRF Switching},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/878},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/878}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.