Paper 2025/901 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/901 ↗
A Generic Framework for Practical Lattice-Based Non-interactive Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing
Abstract
Non-interactive publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) schemes enable the decentralized (re-)sharing of secrets in adversarial environments, allowing anyone to verify the correctness of distributed shares. Such schemes are essential for large-scale decentralized applications, including committee-based systems that require both transparency and robustness. However, existing PVSS schemes rely on group-based cryptography, making them vulnerable to quantum attacks and limiting their suitability for post-quantum applications. In this work, we propose the first practical, fully lattice-based, non-interactive PVSS scheme, grounded on standard lattice assumptions for post-quantum security. At the heart of our design lies a generic framework that transforms vector commitments and linear encryption schemes into practical PVSS protocols. We enhance vector commitments by incorporating proof of smallness, ensuring that encrypted shares are both verifiable and privacy-preserving. Our construction introduces two tailored lattice-based encryption schemes, each supporting efficient proofs of decryption correctness. This framework provides strong verifiability guarantees while maintaining low proof sizes and computational efficiency.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2025-11-08: last updated
- 2025-05-20: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/901
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/901,
author = {Behzad Abdolmaleki and John Clark and Mohammad Foroutani and Shahram Khazaei and Sajjad Nasirzadeh},
title = {A Generic Framework for Practical Lattice-Based Non-interactive Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/901},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/901}
}