Paper 2025/999 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2025/999 ↗
Insecurity of One Ring Signature Scheme with Batch Verification for Applications in VANETs
Abstract
We show that the Negi-Kumar certificateless ring signature scheme [Wirel. Pers. Commun. 134(4): 1987-2011 (2024)] is insecure against forgery attack. The signer's public key $PK_j$ and secret key $PSK_j$ are simply invoked to compute the hash value $H_{2_j}=h_5(m_j\|PSK_j\|PK_j\|t_j)$, which cannot be retrieved by the verifier for checking their dependency. The explicit dependency between the public key and secret key is not properly used to construct some intractable problems, such as Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm (ECDL), Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH), and Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH). An adversary can find an efficient signing algorithm functionally equivalent to the valid signing algorithm. The findings in this note could be helpful for the newcomers who are not familiar with the designing techniques for certificateless ring signature.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2025-05-30: last updated
- 2025-05-30: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/999
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/999,
author = {Zhengjun Cao and Lihua Liu},
title = {Insecurity of One Ring Signature Scheme with Batch Verification for Applications in VANETs},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/999},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/999}
}