Paper 2026/035 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/035 ↗

Adaptive NIKE for Unbounded Parties

Shafik Nassar
Brent Waters
Abstract

This paper presents the first construction of adaptively secure non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) for an unbounded number of parties. Prior unbounded protocols were restricted to static security, with no adaptively secure constructions known even in the random oracle model. Our main contribution is a NIKE scheme in the standard model, that supports an unbounded number of honest and malicious users, as well as unbounded party sizes, while tolerating a bounded number of dynamic user corruptions. The construction is based on sub-exponential indistinguishability obfuscation and sub-exponential fully-homomorphic encryption. A key technical contribution is a new application of what we call a function-extractable hash function. This is a variant of a function binding hash function that enables resilient extraction of properties from maliciously hashed digests. As an additional contribution, we present a compiler in the random oracle model that upgrades any adaptive (unbounded) NIKE that does not support dynamic user corruptions at all into a fully adaptive (unbounded) NIKE that supports an unbounded number of dynamic corruptions. This compiler is completely generic, does not introduce any additional assumptions, and does not rely on sub-exponential hardness.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2026-06-13: last updated
2026-01-08: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/035
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/035,
      author = {Shafik Nassar and Brent Waters},
      title = {Adaptive NIKE for Unbounded Parties},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/035},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/035}
}
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