Paper 2026/1150 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/1150 ↗

The Key Control Security of KDF Combiners

Ritam Bhaumik
Abstract

At CRYPTO 2025, Bhaumik et al. formalised the notion of Key Control (KC) security of Key Derivation Functions (KDFs). A KC adversary, on seeing the root key of a KDF, attempts to manipulate its auxiliary inputs (the `Context' string) to obtain a derived key from a pre-selected set of keys. In this paper we extend the notion of KC security to Key Combining Functions, which are KDFs that convert two root keys to a single derived key; we name the new notion Combining Key Control (CKC) security. We then investigate the CKC security of KDF Combiners and show that (up to certain limitations) it follows from the KC security of either of the component KDFs.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2026-06-29: last updated
2026-06-03: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/1150
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1150,
      author = {Ritam Bhaumik},
      title = {The Key Control Security of KDF Combiners},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1150},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1150}
}
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