Paper 2026/1190 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/1190 ↗

CMoSS: Composable Modular Security Specifications Framework

Sara Wrótniak
Hemi Leibowitz
Ewa Syta
Amir Herzberg
Abstract

CMoSS facilitates modular specifications, design and analysis of cryptographic protocols. Modular design and analysis is achieved by supporting provably-secure compositions of protocols; typically, a protocol uses a blackbox subprotocol, and is proven secure when composed with any subprotocol meeting the blackbox specifications. For modularity of specifications, CMoSS extends the approach of the MoSS framework: protocol specifications are defined modularly, by a set of independent predicates (games) for each model (assumption) and requirement (goal). CMoSS makes it feasible to rigorously specify, develop and analyze realistic applied cryptographic protocols, supporting real-time concurrency and involving different attacker capabilities, delays, faults and synchronization challenges. CMoSS specifications provide a precise formalization of the informal specifications used by practitioners, facilitating provable security for practical protocols.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2026-06-07: last updated
2026-06-07: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/1190
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1190,
      author = {Sara Wrótniak and Hemi Leibowitz and Ewa Syta and Amir Herzberg},
      title = {CMoSS: Composable Modular Security Specifications Framework},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1190},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1190}
}
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