Paper 2026/1403 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/1403 ↗
A polynomial-time key recovery attack of Facto-DSA
Abstract
This work introduces a polynomial-time attack on the signature scheme Facto-DSA. We provide an implementation that breaks all proposed parameter sets, including the largest, in under one minute on a standard laptop. These results question the suitability of multivariate polynomial factorization as a foundation for robust cryptographic schemes.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2026-07-09: last updated
- 2026-07-09: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/1403
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1403,
author = {Simon Abelard and Ludovic Perret and Hao Shi},
title = {A polynomial-time key recovery attack of Facto-DSA},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1403},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1403}
}