Paper 2026/1435 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/1435 ↗

FiltrumVote: Scalable, Verifiable, and Coercion-Resistant Internet Voting

Leonardo Kimura
Dimitri Leskow
Diego F. Aranha
Roberto Araújo
Marcos Simplicio
Abstract

Internet voting can increase voter turnout and reduce operational costs; however, it also facilitates voter coercion. One compelling approach to address this issue is deniable vote updating, which allows voters to cast multiple ballots while counting only their final vote. Despite its intuitive appeal, achieving deniable vote updating together with verifiability and scalability has proven challenging. Therefore, we present FiltrumVote, a scalable, publicly verifiable, and coercion-resistant Internet voting system based on deniable vote updating. It has a quasi-linear cleansing phase, and it is built mainly from zero-knowledge proofs with standard $\Sigma-$protocol techniques. As a result, FiltrumVote is highly scalable: a standard computer takes less than 5 hours to prove all zero-knowledge proofs for one million votes.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2026-07-13: last updated
2026-07-13: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/1435
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1435,
      author = {Leonardo Kimura and Dimitri Leskow and Diego F. Aranha and Roberto Araújo and Marcos Simplicio},
      title = {FiltrumVote: Scalable, Verifiable, and Coercion-Resistant Internet Voting},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1435},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1435}
}
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