Paper 2026/1819 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/1819 ↗
On Memory Effects in PWXL variants
Abstract
We estimate the intrinsic undercounting in the free-memory-access, Macaulay coefficient-on-demand RAM modeling when applied to the Parallelized Wiedemann-based XL in the Ran Wedge attack and in the Furue--Ikematsu intersection attack, under some optimistic but still feasible-sounding assumptions for the attackers. We believe that this shows the memory effects makes UOV secure enough for Ip, Is, and III. If NIST considers our original parameters insufficiently convincing, we do not take Furue's suggested replacements; we offer instead the following perturbations, which hold $m$ --- and hence the compressed public key --- fixed and spend only on the vinegar count: uov-Ip\# (256,116,44), uov-III\# (256,186,72) and uov-V\# (256,250,96).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2026-08-27: last updated
- 2026-08-27: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/1819
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1819,
author = {Jintai Ding and Hao Guo and Bo-Yin Yang},
title = {On Memory Effects in PWXL variants},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1819},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1819}
}