Paper 2026/1918 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/1918 ↗

Towards Practical Privacy-Preserving SAT Solving

Gefei Tan
Wenhao Zhang
Timos Antonopoulos
Ruzica Piskac
Xiao Wang
Ning Luo
Abstract

Privacy-preserving Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solvers allow multiple distrustful parties to solve the conjunction of their private formulas without revealing their inputs. Prior work on privacy-preserving SAT solvers, i.e., ppSAT (USENIX Security 2022), fails to solve formulas of practical size and complexity because it supports only the most basic SAT-solving algorithm. We bring privacy-preserving SAT solving closer to practicality by introducing ppCDCL. Through carefully orchestrated oblivious data structures and solver architecture, our new solver enables conflict-driven clause learning (CDCL) and efficient propagation, the two most important features of modern plaintext SAT solvers. Evaluation results show that ppCDCL outperforms ppSAT in both capability and efficiency. It solves significantly more instances: 98% vs. 65% on the Haplotype benchmarks and 84% vs. 28% on the larger, more diverse SATLIB benchmarks. Furthermore, it solves 36% of SATLIB instances within 1,000 seconds compared to only 4% for ppSAT.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2026-09-08: last updated
2026-09-08: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/1918
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1918,
      author = {Gefei Tan and Wenhao Zhang and Timos Antonopoulos and Ruzica Piskac and Xiao Wang and Ning Luo},
      title = {Towards Practical Privacy-Preserving SAT Solving},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1918},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1918}
}
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