Paper 2026/1964 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/1964 ↗

Three-Round Weak Non-Malleable Zero-Knowledge Argument

Xinxuan Zhang
Yuanju Wei
Zhichao Wang
Zhongliang Zhang
Ming Yang
Ruida Wang
Yi Deng
Hailong Wang
Abstract

Non-malleable zero-knowledge argument(NMZK) is a strong notion of zero-knowledge argument that ensures security against man-in-the-middle(MIM) attacks. While three-round constructions exist for various weak zero-knowledge arguments under standard assumptions, all known (weak) NMZK protocols in the plain model have required at least four rounds. In this work, we construct the \emph{first three-round weak non-malleable zero-knowledge argument} under standard cryptographic assumptions. Our protocol satisfies weak zero-knowledge and $\epsilon$-non-malleability, where the latter allows an $\epsilon$ probability gap between the MIM experiment and the stand-alone experiment for any polynomial inverse $\epsilon$. Our construction relies only on well-established primitives, such as the existence of two-message oblivious transfer protocols and delayed-input WI arguments, non-interactive commitments, and circuit-privacy fully homomorphic encryptions.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2026-09-10: last updated
2026-09-10: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/1964
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/1964,
      author = {Xinxuan Zhang and Yuanju Wei and Zhichao Wang and Zhongliang Zhang and Ming Yang and Ruida Wang and Yi Deng and Hailong Wang},
      title = {Three-Round Weak Non-Malleable Zero-Knowledge Argument},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/1964},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1964}
}
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