Paper 2026/2018 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/2018 ↗
On the (Im)possibility of Asynchronous Proactive Secret Sharing
Abstract
In this paper, we systematically study the (im)possibilities of proactive secret sharing (PSS) in fully asynchronous authenticated networks. To reflect the subtleties arising from the absence of a global clock, we first formalize a hierarchy of natural mobile adversary models for asynchronous PSS (APSS), capturing different adversarial capabilities over corrupted parties and distinct ways of accounting for mobile corruption in asynchrony. Under these models, we then (i) establish new impossibility results by exhibiting generic attacks on APSS, thereby deriving the corresponding resilience upper bounds, and (ii) demonstrate the tightness of these bounds via explicit APSS protocols achieving optimal resilience in each model.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2026-09-14: last updated
- 2026-09-14: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/2018
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2018,
author = {Erica Blum and Yingzi Gao and Julian Loss and Yuan Lu and Zhenliang Lu and Qiang Tang},
title = {On the (Im)possibility of Asynchronous Proactive Secret Sharing},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2018},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2018}
}