Paper 2026/2232 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/2232 ↗
Cryptanalysis of the ICCS NGCC Round-1 Public-Key Candidates
Abstract
The ICCS Next-Generation Commercial Cryptography (NGCC) round-1 call received 84 public-key candidates for public evaluation. We present a design-level assessment that targets weaknesses no local code fix can close, identifying eight such flaws. Each recurs a pitfall already known from NIST PQC standardization: reducible-ring sub-ring projections that break IND-CPA below the claimed level; public data that fixes a value meant to remain secret, enabling public-key-only forgery or keyless decapsulation; static-key reuse without a chosen-ciphertext transform; and rejection sampling whose sign handling leaks an equivalent signing key. All findings were obtained with AI assistance. Artifacts: https://github.com/acprk/ngcc-round1-cryptanalysis.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2026-10-01: last updated
- 2026-09-27: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/2232
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2232,
author = {Zhenyu Xiong and Mingsheng Wang},
title = {Cryptanalysis of the ICCS NGCC Round-1 Public-Key Candidates},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2232},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2232}
}