Paper 2026/2270 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/2270 ↗

UC PAKE and Concrete Security

Tingfei Feng
Jiayu Xu
Abstract

The Universal Composability (UC) framework provides a paradigm for security definitions that allows for arbitrary composition, but has been criticized for being unamicable to the concrete security approach, as the meaning of a concrete UC-security statement is hard to interpret in practice. This work aims at alleviating this concern in the context of Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE): we show that any concrete UC-security statement for PAKE can be easily converted to a concrete game-based security statement, whose real-life meaning is clearer. We also briefly discuss potential generalizations of our result to other cryptographic primitives.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2026-10-08: last updated
2026-09-29: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2270
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2270,
      author = {Tingfei Feng and Jiayu Xu},
      title = {UC PAKE and Concrete Security},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2270},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2270}
}
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