Paper 2026/2282 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/2282 ↗
DAVINCI: A Decentralized Cryptographic Voting Protocol
Abstract
We present DAVINCI, a decentralized end-to-end verifiable voting protocol with no trusted coordinator. The protocol is structured as a zero-knowledge (ZK) rollup: the election is a ZK-verified state machine in which every transition, from ballot submission to final tallying, is encoded as a circuit constraint, so that no actor can force the protocol into an invalid state without breaking the underlying proof system. A decentralized set of sequencers handles ballot validation and aggregation off-chain, while Ethereum serves as a public bulletin board and a data-availability layer via EIP-4844 blobs. For ballot secrecy, DAVINCI uses threshold ElGamal with distributed key generation; for receipt-freeness, sequencers re-encrypt ciphertexts before storing them, and voters may revote at any time. To make revoting effective against bribery and coercion, DAVINCI introduces silent revoting on every state update, sequencers also re-randomize a random subset of stored ballots, and we quantify how well this hides overwrites among routine refreshes. Our open-source implementation shows that DAVINCI supports large-scale elections with succinct on-chain verification and ballot proofs generated on commodity devices, under the honest-device assumption shared by several deployed verifiable-voting systems.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2026-09-30: last updated
- 2026-09-30: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/2282
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2282,
author = {Pau Escrich and Marta Bellés-Muñoz and Roger Baig and Jordi Piñana},
title = {DAVINCI: A Decentralized Cryptographic Voting Protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2282},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2282}
}