Paper 2026/2410 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/2410 ↗

KIFA: Kernel-based Integral Fault Analysis on GIFT-Family Ciphers

Hanbeom Shin
Yunjae Hwang
Donggeun Kwon
Byoungjin Seok
Deukjo Hong
Jaechul Sung
Seokhie Hong
Dongjae Lee
Abstract

We present KIFA (Kernel-based Integral Fault Analysis), an integral fault attack framework that mines its balanced properties with the kernel-based miner of Hwang et al. in place of Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP). The miner handles only small input structures fixed in advance, and a fault model provides exactly such structures. For DEFAULT, we present attacks at fault penetration (FP) $9$ under a random-position nibble fault and FP $10$ under a random-position byte fault, beyond the prior best integral fault attack at FP $8$. They leave a single master-key candidate under the simple key schedule and reduce the key space to $2^{64}$ under the rotating key schedule. For GIFT-128, we present the first integral fault attacks, at FP $7$ and $8$, against the prior best of $5$. For GIFT-64, we extend the prior best FP $6$ to $7$ with a byte fault, leaving $2^{32}$ master-key candidates. For BAKSHEESH, we extend the prior best FP $7$ to $8$, also when the fault position is uncontrolled.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2026-10-08: last updated
2026-10-08: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2410
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2410,
      author = {Hanbeom Shin and Yunjae Hwang and Donggeun Kwon and Byoungjin Seok and Deukjo Hong and Jaechul Sung and Seokhie Hong and Dongjae Lee},
      title = {KIFA: Kernel-based Integral Fault Analysis on GIFT-Family Ciphers},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2410},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2410}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.