Paper 2026/249 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/249 ↗

Have Your CKAKE and Eat it, Too: Efficient, Composable KEM-Authenticated Key Exchange

Myrto Arapinis
Christopher Battarbee
Mina Doosti
Abstract

We report on a novel authenticated key-exchange (AKE) protocol where the authentication is achieved entirely by key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). Techniques to achieve AKE with KEMs have been known for some time, but have received renewed attention in a post-quantum world; in contrast to classical cryptography, the data corresponding to the NIST post-quantum KEM standard is a significant save on bandwidth compared to the signature standard. Previous KEM-authenticated AKE protocols are not known to be composable; our protocol offers similar security guarantees, plus composability, while being more efficient in terms of bandwidth compared to non-composable KEM-based AKE protocols, and composable signature-based AKE protocols. Our protocol features a modular design, and a full security proof in the Constructive Cryptography (CC) framework, one of the major composable security frameworks. We also prove the forward secrecy of our protocol, and introduce generic techniques to prove forward secrecy in CC, which may be of independent interest.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2026-02-25: last updated
2026-02-13: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/249
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/249,
      author = {Myrto Arapinis and Christopher Battarbee and Mina Doosti},
      title = {Have Your CKAKE and Eat it, Too: Efficient, Composable KEM-Authenticated Key Exchange},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/249},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/249}
}
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