Paper 2026/2795 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/2795 ↗

Exploiting Matrix-Vector Multiplication in AIMer: Single-Trace Attacks on Key Generation and Signing

Süleyman Emir Akın
Abdullah Talayhan
Özcan Öztürk
Abstract

This paper presents two side-channel attacks against AIMer v3.0, one of the two signature schemes selected in the Korean Post-Quantum Cryptography (KpqC) competition. Both are single-trace attacks that recover the full secret key without a profiling phase, one against key generation and one against signing. Both target the same routine: the matrix-vector multiplication invoked by either phase expands each bit of its secret operand into an all-zero or an all-one mask, which then gates the accumulation of the corresponding public matrix row. A single execution therefore leaks one distinguishable segment per secret bit. What makes the attacks non-profiled is that each attacked trace carries its own labelled training set. During key generation, creating the dense invertible public matrices invokes the matrix-vector multiplication routine hundreds of times, on operands that are public. In signing the same derivation takes place, and in addition the signature itself opens all but one of the $N$ parties of every repetition, so the bits of nearly every multiplication in the trace are public. In both attacks we use a supervised classifier to recover the unknown value. In key generation that value is the private key itself, whereas in signing there are three distinct routes to it: the key itself, a party's share of the key, and a party's share of an S-box output. Recovering any one of them is enough to recover the private key. We validate both attacks on an ARM Cortex-M4: one trace recovers the exact secret key from every capture we took, $100$ key generations for each of AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256, and $100$ signatures for each of AES-128f, AES-192f and AES-256f. We also discuss possible countermeasures.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2026-11-06: last updated
2026-11-06: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/2795
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/2795,
      author = {Süleyman Emir Akın and Abdullah Talayhan and Özcan Öztürk},
      title = {Exploiting Matrix-Vector Multiplication in AIMer: Single-Trace Attacks on Key Generation and Signing},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/2795},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2795}
}
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