Paper 2026/294 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/294 ↗

Post-Quantum Adaptor Signatures with Strong Security from Cryptographic Group Actions

Ryann Cartor
Nathan Daly
Giulia Gaggero
Jason T. LeGrow
Andrea Sanguineti
Silvia Sconza
Abstract

We present One Round "Cheating" Adaptor Signatures (OR- CAS): a novel and efficient construction of adaptor signature schemes from CSI-FiSh. Our protocol improves substantially on existing group action-based schemes: Unlike IAS (Tairi et al., FC 2021), our scheme does not require expensive non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, and unlike adaptor MCSI-FiSh (Jana et al., CANS 2024) our construction does not require any modification to the underlying digital signature scheme. We prove the protocol’s security under the strong security no- tions of Dai et al. (Indocrypt 2022) and Gerhart et al. (Eurocrypt 2024).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2026-02-24: last updated
2026-02-17: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/294
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/294,
      author = {Ryann Cartor and Nathan Daly and Giulia Gaggero and Jason T. LeGrow and Andrea Sanguineti and Silvia Sconza},
      title = {Post-Quantum Adaptor Signatures with Strong Security from Cryptographic Group Actions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/294},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/294}
}
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