Paper 2026/528 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/528 ↗

Full Secret Key Recovery of First-order Masked Crystals-Kyber implementation using multiple distinct chosen-ciphertexts

Souhayl Ben El Haj Soulami
Yann Connan
Sylvain Duquesne
Abstract

Abstract. We present a novel side-channel attack on first-order masked implementations of Crystals-Kyber. It deploys a new distinguisher in the context of post-quantum cryptography. It relies on combining the in formation from several instances of the same distinguisher via multiple ciphertexts decryption requests. The attack has been performed on simu lation and illustrated on the masked implementation of Bronchain et al.. This attack is instantiated in a very noisy environment (Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of 0.67) and provides a success rate of 95% with 75000 traces for full secret key recovery.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2026-03-16: last updated
2026-03-16: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/528
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/528,
      author = {Souhayl Ben El Haj Soulami and Yann Connan and Sylvain Duquesne},
      title = {Full Secret Key Recovery of First-order Masked Crystals-Kyber implementation using multiple distinct chosen-ciphertexts},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/528},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/528}
}
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