Paper 2026/835 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/835 ↗
Fault Injection Attacks Against zkSTARKs
Abstract
Fault injection attacks on zero-knowledge (ZK) constructions have received little attention in the wider literature. Recent work has demonstrated single-fault key recovery attacks against a ZK signature scheme. In this paper, we detail candidate fault injection attacks against zero-knowledge scalable transparent argument of knowledge (zkSTARK) provers, designed to violate ZK capabilities. zkSTARK proving systems are complex, and implementations differ substantially in their implementation specifics. We propose a corresponding variety of fault injection attacks against different popular algorithmic primitives. To the best of our knowledge, this marks the first exploration of the fault injection surface of zkSTARKs, and of the wider class of general-purpose ZK proving systems.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2026-10-14: last updated
- 2026-04-28: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2026/835
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/835,
author = {Alexander Dalton and Markus Schofnegger and Daniel Page},
title = {Fault Injection Attacks Against zkSTARKs},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/835},
year = {2026},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/835}
}