Paper 2026/867 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/867 ↗

On the (Privacy) Harms of the European Digital Identity Framework

Abstract

As digital identity frameworks (DIFs) gain traction around the world, many see privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) as the key to prevent their potential negative societal impacts such as discrimination or surveillance. We critically examine whether PETs can achieve this goal using the European Digital Identity Framework (EUDIF) as an example. We develop a harm analysis methodology based on harm trees that illustrates how information leakage, certain design decisions, or a DIF's deployment context lead to harms. We leverage techniques from cryptographic modeling to formally capture the leakage of the core functionality of the EUDIF and its proposed applications. Our harm modeling elucidates which pathways to harm are inherent to the EUDIF's core functionality, and which pathways can be mitigated through PETs. Our analysis shows that, while PETs can reduce information flows, they fall short in actually mitigating the harms that deploying digital identity can bring to individuals and society.