Paper 2026/873 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/873 ↗

Adaptor Signature Schemes with Deniable Presignatures

Abstract

An adaptor signature scheme can be seen as committing to a signature using an NP statement, in such a way that (1) the commitment, called a presignature, is verifiable, (2) the corresponding witness enables opening the commitment (adapting the presignature), and (3) seeing a valid commitment-opening (presignature-signature) pair leaks the witness. In the blockchain space, where signed transactions must be broadcast to the public to take effect, this last property allows "forcing" a party to leak a witness for possibly multiple presignatures issued for the same NP statement. This then gives rise to many applications such as atomic swaps or payment channels. Importantly, in prevailing adaptor signature schemes, presignatures are already technically signatures, in that they are non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of the signing key. This has a number of consequences, most important being that the presignature constitutes evidence of intent to participate in a protocol based on adaptor signatures. Perhaps surprisingly, however, for many practical applications, this strong "binding" of presignatures turns out to be non-essential. In this work, we revisit the definitions of adaptor signature schemes, demonstrating that prevailing security requirements are often too strict. To this end, we formally define fair signature exchange (FSE) and abandon the assumption implicit in prior work that adaptor-based FSE must be "symmetric" with both parties using the same adaptor signature scheme. The resulting relaxation of security requirements leads us to the notion of presignature deniability, an extension to adaptor signature schemes that we define formally and construct from various assumptions.