Paper 2026/973 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2026/973 ↗

Asynchronous Shamir-Based Threshold FHE: Smaller Moduli and Strong Simulation Security

Won Kim
Changmin Lee
JeongHwan Lee
Alain Passelègue
Damien Stehlé
Abstract

We study $t$-out-of-$n$ threshold fully homomorphic encryption (ThFHE) based on Shamir secret sharing (SSS) in the asynchronous setting. With SSS, a partial decryption share is a single ring element; this allows to avoid the large number of ring elements stored per party required by prior strongly secure constructions based on $\{0,1\}$ reconstruction coefficients. However, this reduction introduces a fundamental trade-off: Lagrange reconstruction during distributed decryption severely amplifies noise, forcing a substantially larger ciphertext modulus. In this work, we give SSS-based asynchronous ThFHE constructions over standard RLWE-based FHE schemes (BFV, BGV, and CKKS) for both standard and strong simulation security. Through tight analysis of the modulus constraints, our constructions simultaneously reduce the required modulus, compared with prior asynchronous Shamir-based constructions, and the per-party storage, compared with the prior strongly secure construction. For example, for $n=512$ under standard simulation security, our analysis reduces the modulus overhead of distributed decryption by $33 \%$ at $t=n/2$ and by up to $90\%$ for $t$ close to $n$, relative to the prior works. Under strong simulation security, the per-party storage for $n=16$ and $t=8$ at $128$-bit security drops from $79$ GB in prior work to $897$ KB.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2026-09-17: last updated
2026-05-16: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/973
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/973,
      author = {Won Kim and Changmin Lee and JeongHwan Lee and Alain Passelègue and Damien Stehlé},
      title = {Asynchronous Shamir-Based Threshold FHE: Smaller Moduli and Strong Simulation Security},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/973},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/973}
}
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